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1Covert Wireless Communication with a
Poisson Field of Interferers
Biao He, Member, IEEE, Shihao Yan, Member, IEEE, Xiangyun Zhou, Senior
Member, IEEE, Hamid Jafarkhani, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
In this paper, we study covert communication in wireless networks consisting of a transmitter,
Alice, an intended receiver, Bob, a warden, Willie, and a Poisson field of interferers. Bob and Willie
are subject to uncertain shot noise due to the ambient signals from interferers in the network. With the
aid of stochastic geometry, we analyze the throughput of the covert communication between Alice and
Bob subject to given requirements on the covertness against Willie and the reliability of decoding at
Bob. We consider non-fading and fading channels. We analytically obtain interesting findings on the
impacts of the density and the transmit power of the concurrent interferers on the covert throughput.
That is, the density and the transmit power of the interferers have no impact on the covert throughput
as long as the network stays in the interference-limited regime, for both the non-fading and the fading
cases. When the interference is sufficiently small and comparable with the receiver noise, the covert
throughput increases as the density or the transmit power of the concurrent interferers increases.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, covert wireless communication, stochastic geometry, signal processing.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an unprecedented amount of private and sensitive information is transmitted over the open
wireless medium, secure communication against eavesdropping has drawn significant attention
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2from wireless researchers and engineers [1, 2]. In certain circumstances, protecting the content of
the transmitted information is not sufficient. In order to avoid monitoring and maintain privacy,
the communication itself is sometimes required to stay undetectable in the presence of wardens,
which motivates the increasing effort devoted to the study on covert communication. In principle,
the techniques of physical layer security and covert communication are designed or studied
to achieve different objectives. Physical layer security focuses on protecting the content of
communications, while covert communication hopes to hide the communication process. Thus,
it is usually not feasible to directly apply the studies and techniques of physical layer security
to covert communication.
Although spread spectrum techniques have been studied since a century ago for hiding wireless
transmissions, a recent interest in the fundamental limits of covert communication has arisen.
Concretely, the studies in the recent trend are interested in the throughput at which the transmitter
and the receiver may communicate reliably while guaranteeing a low probability of detection
from the warden. In particular, a square root law has been derived regarding the number of
bits that can be covertly and reliably transmitted over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels [3]. Specifically, with an arbitrarily low probability of being detected, one can reliably
send at most O (√n) bits over n uses of the channel, which further implies that the asymptotic
covert rate approaches zero. The work of [3] has then been extended to different scenarios, e.g.,
binary symmetric channels (BSCs) [4], discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) [5], and multiple
access channels (MACs) [6].
The pessimistic zero covert throughput implied by the square root law motivates some studies
exploring the conditions in which positive covert throughput is achievable. It has been found
that positive covert throughput can be achieved when the warden has uncertainty on the power
of noise or interference at its receiver [7–10]. With a worst-case consideration from the warden’s
perspective, the study in [7] pointed out that the positive covert throughput is achievable when
the warden has uncertainty about its receiver noise power. Also, for the scenario that the warden
has uncertainty about its receiver noise power, the study in [8] showed the positive covert
throughput with the consideration of the overall performance at the warden instead of the worst-
case consideration from the warden’s perspective. Moreover, the covert communication with a
positive rate has been proved to be achievable when a friendly jammer sends artificial noise so
that the warden has uncertainty on the interference at its receiver [9, 10].
In practical wireless networks, a major source of the uncertain interference or noise at the
3receiver is actually the ambient signals from other transmitters, and the uncertainty of the
aggregate received interference at the warden may help to achieve the positive covert throughput.
Thus, investigating the covert communication in wireless network scenarios is of a significant
importance. Although the secrecy issue of communication in wireless network scenarios has
been extensively studied in the literature, e.g., [11–13], the covertness issue of communication
in wireless network scenarios has been rarely studied. The covert communication in wireless
networks has been studied very recently in [10]. However, the work in [10] considered that all
other communication nodes in the network are friendly helpers of the legitimate transmitter, and
the closest friendly helper to the warden is selected to intentionally transmit artificial noise to
confuse the warden. The requirement that all communication nodes are friendly helpers [10] is
often difficult to achieve in practical wireless networks. It is worth mentioning that the covert
communication in wireless networks has also been studied in [14–16]. Different from the afore-
mentioned papers, [14–16] studied the covert networks through the concept of spectral outage
probability, while the throughput at which the transmitter and the receiver may communicate
reliably while guaranteeing a low probability of detection from the warden was not investigated.
Similarly, [17] investigated the covert communication in the presence of primary networks based
on the signal-to-interference-noise ratio (SINR).
In this work, we study the covert communication in wireless networks with the aid of stochastic
geometry. Instead of assuming that all communication nodes in the network are friendly helpers,
we consider that all nodes in the network, which are distributed according to a homogeneous
Poisson point process (PPP), randomly transmit without the intention to help the covert com-
munication, so that the aggregate received interference at the receiver is the well known shot
noise. A shot noise process can represent the aggregated interferences when the nodes in the
network are distributed according to a stochastic point process [18]. The investigated scenario
is that a pair of communication nodes want to achieve covert communication by making use of
the existing wireless network environment. The hope is to hide the communication by using the
time varying interference created by all users in the large-scale wireless network. We note that
the secrecy issue of wireless networks and the aggregate interference in wireless networks have
been widely studied in the literature, e.g., [14, 19–29]. It is worth mentioning that our results
are novel compared with those existing papers, since they have not considered the covertness
issue of wireless networks.
The primary contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
41) We comprehensively study the covert communication in wireless networks subject to shot
noise [18]. We analyze the average covert probability, the connection outage probability, and
the covert throughput to capture the covertness, reliability, and overall rate performances
of the system, respectively.
2) We evaluate the impact of the density and the transmit power of the concurrent interferers in
the network on the covert throughput. For the interference-limited network, we analytically
find that the covert throughput is affected by neither the density nor the transmit power of
the concurrent interferers for both cases of non-fading and fading channels.
3) While the expressions for the average covert probabilities are complicated for general values
of the path loss exponent, α, due to the stochastic geometry, we further consider the special
case of α = 4 to derive the simplified expressions for the average covert probabilities for
both the non-fading and the fading cases.
4) We examine the impact of the AWGN on the performances of the covert communication in
wireless networks. We find that the AWGN does not affect the average covert probability
of the system in wireless networks, while it decreases the covert throughput of the system
for both the non-fading and the fading cases. Moreover, we find that the covert throughput
increases as the density or the transmit power of the concurrent interferers increases when
the AWGN is taken into account.
Throughout the paper, we adopt the following notations: Q(·) denotes the tail probability of
the standard normal distribution, Γ(·) denotes the standard gamma function, Γ(·, ·) denotes the
upper incomplete gamma function, CN (µ, σ2) denotes the complex Gaussian distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2, csc(·) denotes the cosecant function, [x]+ denotes max{x, 0}, and P
denotes the probability measure.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Figure 1, we consider a two-dimensional wireless network which consists of a
transmitter, Alice, a receiver, Bob, a warden, Willie, and a Poisson field of interferers. Bob is
located at a distance dab from Alice and Willie is located at a distance daw from Alice. We do
not consider the relative motion between Alice, Bob, and Willie. The locations of concurrent
interferers follow a homogeneous PPP, denoted by Φ, with node density λI . The system is
assumed to be slotted in time, and the locations of concurrent interferers remain static in a slot.
We assume that the locations of current interferers change at each time slot, which happens in,
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the network model for covert wireless communications with a Poisson field of interferers.
e.g., mobile networks, due to either the random access or the mobility, or both. Willie would like
to detect if Alice is transmitting in a slot, while Alice attempts to transmit messages to Bob with a
low probability of being detected. We assume that all nodes in the network have a single antenna.
We further assume that the transmitted signals from Alice and the interferers are independent
zero-mean complex Gaussian signals. It is worth mentioning that the assumption of Gaussian
codebooks for the interferers has negligible effect on the aggregate network interference [24].
We assume that the codeword is kept secret from Willie [3]. In addition, we assume that the
pathloss effects and the fading coefficients remain constant in a slot.
Denote the normalized transmitted signal from Alice by x[n] ∼ CN (0, 1), where n =
1, 2, · · · , N . When Alice is transmitting with power Pa, the received signals at Bob and Willie
are, respectively, given by
yb[n] =
√
Pa
dαab
habx[n] + vb[n] + zb[n] (1)
yw[n] =
√
Pa
dαaw
hawx[n] + vw[n] + zw[n], (2)
where the subscripts b and w denote Bob and Willie, respectively, α ≥ 2 denotes the path loss
exponent, hab and haw denote the normalized channel coefficients from Alice to the receivers,
vb[n] ∼ CN
(
0, σ2vb
)
and vw[n] ∼ CN
(
0, σ2vw
)
denote the aggregate received interferences,
and zb[n] ∼ CN
(
0, σ2zb
)
and zw[n] ∼ CN
(
0, σ2zw
)
denote the AWGN. We note that vb[n] and
vw[n] are usually correlated in practice due to the spatial correlation of the interferences [30–
33], while the correlation between vb[n] and vw[n] does not affect the analysis and results in
6the paper. We denote the received signal power at Bob and Willie by Pb = Pa |hab|2 /dαab and
Pw = Pa |haw|2 /dαaw, respectively. We assume that Bob and Willie know Alice’s transmit power
and the instantaneous channel coefficients from Alice to themselves.
The powers of aggregate received interferences at Bob and Willie are, respectively, given by
σ2vb =
∑
i∈Φ
Pi
dαib
|hib|2 (3)
σ2vw =
∑
i∈Φ
Pi
dαiw
|hiw|2 , (4)
where Pi denotes the transmit power of the interferer, dib and diw denote the distances from the
interferer to the receivers, and hib and hiw denote the normalized channel coefficients from the
interferer to the receivers. We assume that all interferers have the same transmit power [34],
such that Pi = PI , ∀i ∈ Φ. Due to the random spatial distribution of the interferers and the
random channel coefficients, the powers of the aggregate received interferences, σ2vb and σ
2
vw ,
are random variables. With the stationary property of PPP [34], σ2vb and σ
2
vw in fact have the
same distribution, which is denoted by fσ2v(x). We assume that Willie knows the distribution of
the power of the aggregate received interference, fσ2v(x), while he does not know the power of
the instantaneous aggregate received interference in a slot. Note in the slotted system model that
the power of aggregate received interferences remains static for all N samples in a time slot.
For the analysis in the paper, we mainly focus on the interference-limited network [34], such
that σ2zb = σ
2
zw = 0. In fact, having non-zero AWGN does not affect the average covert probability
of the considered system, and we will discuss the impact of having non-zero AWGN, i.e., σ2zb 6= 0
and σ2zw 6= 0, later in Section V. The average covert probability is the adopted covertness measure
in this paper, which will be given later in Section II-B1.
A. Willie’s Hypothesis Test
In the interference-limited network, Willie attempts to determine whether Alice is transmitting
or not by distinguishing the following two hypotheses:
H0 : yw[n] = vw[n], (5a)
H1 : yw[n] =
√
Pa
dαaw
hawx[n] + vw[n]. (5b)
7Based on the received signal vector yw = [yw[1], · · · , yw[n]], Willie makes a binary decision
on whether the received signal is the interference or the signal from Alice plus the interfer-
ence. When Willie adopts a radiometer as the detector, the test statistic is given by T (yw) =
(1/N)
∑N
n=1 |yw[n]|2. Throughout this paper, we assume that Willie adopts a radiometer as
the detector [7], since the radiometer is often used in practice. A detailed justification of this
assumption can be found in [35].
Denote D0 and D1 as the decision that the received signal is the interference and the decision
that the received signal is the signal from Alice plus the interference, respectively. As per the
mechanism of radiometer, Willie makes the decision of D0 if T (yw) ≤ γ, and the decision of
D1 if T (yw) > γ, where γ > 0 is the threshold of Willie’s detector. The design of the threshold
γ is crucial for the performance of Willie’s radiometer [36]. The false alarm probability and the
misdetection probability are, respectively, defined as
PFA = P (D1 | H0) (6)
PMD = P (D0 | H1) . (7)
Since the false alarm and the misdetection are the two types of errors for Willie’s hypothesis test,
following the existing studies on covert communication, the performance of Willie’s hypothesis
test is measured by
ξ = PFA + PMD, (8)
where 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. In particular, ξ = 0 indicates that Willie can perfectly detect the transmission
without error. In contrast, ξ = 1 indicates that Willie cannot detect the transmission at all, which
is equivalent to a random guess.
For given γ, σ2vw , and Pw, we have the following equations. The likelihood functions of T (yw)
under H0 and H1 are, respectively, given by
P (T (yw)|H0) = (T (yw))
N−1
Γ(N)
(
N
σ2vw
)N
exp
(
−NT (yw)
σ2vw
)
(9)
and
P (T (yw)|H1) = (T (yw))
N−1
Γ(N)
(
N
Pw + σ2vw
)N
exp
(
− NT (yw)
Pw + σ2vw
)
. (10)
Then, the false alarm probability and the misdetection probability for a given threshold γ are,
respectively, given by
PFA =
Γ
(
N, Nγ
σ2vw
)
Γ(N)
(11)
8and
PMD = 1−
Γ
(
N, Nγ
Pw+σ2vw
)
Γ(N)
. (12)
Following the widely-adopted assumption in the analysis on covert communication [7, 8, 37], we
assume that N →∞ to allow Willie to get an infinite number of samples for his detection. This
is an upper bound on the number of samples that Willie can get in practice. When N →∞, we
have
ξ
(
γ, σ2vw , Pw
)
=
 0 , if σ2vw ≤ γ ≤ Pw + σ2vw1 , otherwise. (13)
B. Covertness Measure
We note that, for any given detection threshold γ > 0, ξ in (13) is a random variable that
follows the Bernoulli distribution, due to the randomness of σ2vw and Pw. The overall performance
of covertness is then measured by either the average covert probability or the covert outage
probability [8]. It is worth mentioning that we do not consider the issue of signal detection at
Bob, and assume that Bob knows when Alice transmits. This can be realized in practice by
sharing a secret timetable between Alice and Bob.
1) Average Covert Probability: The average covert probability captures the average covertness
of the system from a Bayesian statistics perspective [38]. The average covert probability is given
by [8]
ξ¯(Pa) =
∫ ∞
0
min
γ>0
∫ ∞
0
ξ
(
γ, σ2vw , Pw
)
fσ2v
(
σ2vw
)
dσ2vwfPw (Pw) dPw, (14)
where fPw (x) denotes the distribution of Pw. Since Pw = Pa |haw|2 /dαaw, fPw(x) is determined
by the value of Pa/dαaw and the distribution of |haw|2. Note that minγ in (14) indicates that
Willie can use the optimal detection threshold γ for his detection of Alice’s transmission,
since the optimal threshold at Willie minimizes his detection error, which is characterized by∫∞
0
ξ
(
γ, σ2vw , Pw
)
fσ2v
(
σ2vw
)
dσ2vw for given Pw. Hence, measuring the covertness of a system by
ξ¯ is robust from the perspective of the legitimate users, i.e., Alice and Bob.
2) Covert Outage Probability: The covert outage probability captures the probability that
covert communication fails. From the outage-based approach, the covert outage probability is
given by [8]
pcvout(Pa) =
∫ ∞
0
max
γ>0
P
(
ξ
(
γ, σ2vw , Pw
)
< 1
)
fPw (Pw) dPw. (15)
9Note that the concept of covert outage probability is similar to the concept of secrecy outage
probability [39], which characterizes the probability that secure communication fails.
It is easy to find that pcvout = 1 − ξ¯ in this work, due to the Bernoulli distribution of ξ as
N → ∞. Thus, we adopt the average covert probability ξ¯ to measure the covertness of the
system. It is worth mentioning that pcvout 6= 1− ξ¯ when ξ (σ2w, γ) starts taking values within the
range of (0, 1), which happens when Willie has a finite number of samples [40].
C. Reliability Measure
Due to the fact that the power of instantaneous aggregate received interference at Bob, σ2vb , is
unknown, every possible target transmission rate is associated with an unavoidable probability
of connection outage. Thus, we measure the reliability performance of the system by connection
outage probability, which is given by
pcnout(Pa, R) = P
(
log2
(
1 +
Pb
σ2vb
)
< R
)
= P
(
σ2vb > Pb
(
2R − 1)−1)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
Pb(2R−1)−1
fσ2v
(
σ2vb
)
dσ2vbfPb (Pb) dPb, (16)
where R denotes the data transmission rate, the inter integral is over the range σ2vb in which the
connection outage happens for a given Pb, and the outer integral is over the range of all possible
values of Pb.
D. Covert Throughput
With the consideration of both covertness and reliability, the overall rate performance of the
system is evaluated by covert throughput. The covert throughput captures the maximum achiev-
able data transmission rate subject to both covertness requirement and reliability requirement,
which is given by
η = max R, s.t. ξ¯(Pa) ≥ 1−  and pcnout(Pa, R) ≤ δ, (17)
where 1 −  denotes the acceptable minimum average covert probability and δ denotes the
acceptable maximum connection outage probability. The feasible range of  is 0 <  < 1, since
the system can satisfy any required 0 <  < 1 by adjusting the transmit power at Alice Pa > 0.
The feasible range of δ is 0 < δ < 1, since the system can satisfy any required 0 < δ < 1
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for any given Pa by adjusting the transmit rate R > 0. Note that the covert throughput in (17)
would become the well-known outage throughput [41], if the average covert probability is not
considered. If the covertness requirement is replaced by a secrecy requirement, e.g., a secrecy
outage requirement, (17) can be used to measure the throughput for wireless networks with
secrecy concerns.
III. COVERT COMMUNICATION IN INTERFERENCE-LIMITED NETWORK WITHOUT FADING
In this section, we study covert communication in the interference-limited network and assume
that there is no fading, such that haj = hij = 1, where j = b or w and i ∈ Φ. Then, Pb = Pa/dαab
and Pw = Pa/dαaw are fixed for a given transmit power Pa. Given |hiw|2 = 1 and the expressions
for σ2vb and σ
2
vw in (3) and (4), the distribution of σ
2
vb
and σ2vw for the case of non-fading channels
is found as an infinite series [42]:
fσ2v(x) =
1
pix
∞∑
k=1
Γ
(
α+2k
α
)
k!
piλIΓ (α−2α )P 2αI
x
2
α
k sin(kpi(α− 2
α
))
, x > 0. (18)
Based on (13) and (14), the average covert probability for the case of non-fading channels is
given by
ξ¯ = min
γ>0
∫ ∞
0
ξ
(
γ, σ2vw
)
fσ2v
(
σ2vw
)
dσ2vw
= 1−max
γ>0
∫ γ
max{γ−Pw, 0}
fσ2v
(
σ2vw
)
dσ2vw
(a)
= 1− max
γ>Pw
∫ γ
γ−Pw
fσ2v
(
σ2vw
)
dσ2vw , (19)
where (a) is due to fσ2v
(
σ2vw
)
> 0 for any σ2vw > 0. Substituting (18) into (19), we further derive
the average covert probability for the case of non-fading channels as
ξ¯ = 1− 1
pi
max
γ>Pad
−α
aw
∞∑
k=1
Γ
(
2k
α
) (
piλIΓ
(
α−2
α
)
P
2
α
I
)k
k!
sin
(
kpi
(
α− 2
α
))(
1
(γ−Pad−αaw )
2k
α
− 1
γ
2k
α
)
.
(20)
Based on (16) and (18), the connection outage probability for the case of non-fading channels
is given by
pcnout =
∫ ∞
Pb(2R−1)−1
fσ2v
(
σ2vb
)
dσ2vbfPb (Pb)
=
1
pi
∞∑
k=1
Γ
(
2k
α
)
k!
 piλIΓ (α−2α )P 2αI
P
2
α
a d
−2
ab (2
R − 1)− 2α
k sin(kpi(α− 2
α
))
. (21)
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We know from the definition of connection outage probability that the connection outage
probability, pcnout, monotonously increases as the transmission rate, R, increases or the transmit
power at Alice, Pa, decreases. We also know from the definition of average covert probability
that the average covert probability ξ¯, decreases as Pa increases. Then, the basic method to obtain
the covert throughput η is described as follows. We first solve for Pa to ξ¯(Pa) =  to find the
maximum allowable transmit power at Alice subject to the constraint of the covertness, denoted
by P ∗a . With the derived P
∗
a , we solve for R to p
cn
out(Pa) = δ with Pa = P
∗
a to obtain η. However,
neither the solution of Pa to ξ¯(Pa) =  nor the solution of R to pcnout(Pa, R) = δ is analytically
tractable, since ξ¯ and pcnout can be given by complicated infinite series only. Thus, the derivation
of the covert throughput for the case of non-fading channels is analytically intractable.
Although (20) and (21) may be complicated to calculate, nevertheless they are crucial in
analyzing the impacts of the density and the transmit power of the concurrent interferers on
the covert throughput in the interference-limited network with a Poisson field of interferers over
non-fading channels, as will be shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: In the interference-limited network with a Poisson field of interferers over non-
fading channels, the covert throughput, η, is not affected by the density of concurrent interferers,
λI , or the transmit power at the interferers, PI .
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note from the definition of covert throughput in (17) that Theorem 1 is valid when Pa is
optimally chosen to satisfy the covertness and the reliability constraints. We would like to
highlight the importance of the finding in Theorem 1. In the literature on wireless networks,
the density and the transmit power are usually regarded as main factors affecting the overall
throughput performance; see, e.g., [34] for conventional wireless networks and [2, 13] for wireless
networks with secrecy concerns. Interestingly, our analysis shows that the throughput for covert
communication in the interference-limited network over non-fading channels is not affected by
either the density or the transmit power of the concurrent interferers in the network. Intuitively,
a large interference is beneficial for hiding a higher transmit power from Alice in Willie’s
uncertainty. On the other hand, a large interference leads to a higher noise for Bob. Thus,
the increase of the interference power has both positive and negative effects on the overall
rate performance, which is characterized by the covert throughput. Theorem 1 implies that the
positive and negative effects are balanced.
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A. Special Case of α = 4
We now consider the special case of α = 4, which is for the case on the ground or relatively
lossy environments [43]. Note that the closed-form expression for the distribution of the aggregate
interference power exists for α = 4 only [34].
When α = 4 and hij = 1, σ2vj follows the Le´vy distribution with the scalar parameter ζ =
pi3λ2IPI/2 [34], and we have
fσ2v(x) =
piλI
√
PI
2x
3
2
exp
(
−pi
3λ2IPI
4x
)
, x > 0. (22)
The average covert probability for the case of non-fading channels with α = 4 is given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: The average covert probability for the system over non-fading channels with
α = 4 is given by
ξ¯ = 1− erf
(
pi
3
2λI
√
PI
2
√
xo − Pad−4aw
)
+ erf
(
pi
3
2λI
√
PI
2
√
xo
)
, (23)
where erf(·) denotes the error function and xo is the solution of x ≥ Pw to(
x− Pad−4aw
) 3
2 exp
(
−pi
3λ2IPI
4x
)
− x 32 exp
(
− pi
3λ2IPI
4 (x− Pad−4aw)
)
= 0. (24)
Proof: See Appendix B.
The connection outage probability for the case of non-fading channels with α = 4 is given by
pcnout =
∫ ∞
Pb(2R−1)−1
fσ2v
(
σ2vb
)
dσ2vb = erf
(
pi
3
2λId
2
ab
√
PI (2R − 1)
2
√
Pa
)
. (25)
For the case of α = 4, the solution of Pa to ξ¯(Pa) =  can be numerically obtained and the
solution of R to pcnout(Pa, R) = δ is analytically tractable, which is given by
R = log2
(
1 +
4Pa
(
erf−1(δ)
)2
PIpi3λ2Id
4
ab
)
. (26)
With the previously discussed method and the finding in Theorem 1, we can obtain the covert
throughput of the considered system over non-fading channels with α = 4 by an iterative
algorithm. For brevity, we do not present the detailed algorithm here. Instead, we summarize
the basic idea of the algorithm as follows. Since the covert throughput is not affected by the
density and the transmit power of concurrent interferers, we consider pi3λ2IPI/4 = 1 to simplify
the expressions for (23), (24), and (26). We first adopt the one-side-search technique to decide
the searching range of P ∗a [44], and then adopt the bisection-search technique to find P
∗
a . Finally,
η is obtained according to (26).
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IV. COVERT COMMUNICATION IN INTERFERENCE-LIMITED NETWORK WITH FADING
We now study the covert communication in the case of fading channels. Denote the distribution
of |hij|2, where j = b or w and i ∈ Φ, by fh(x). Then, the distributions of Pb = Pa |hab|2 /dαab
and Pw = Pa |haw|2 /dαaw for a given transmit power Pa are, respectively, given by
fPb(x) =
dαaw
Pa
fh
(
dαabx
Pa
)
(27)
fPw(x) =
dαaw
Pa
fh
(
dαawx
Pa
)
. (28)
The distribution of σ2vb or σ
2
vw for the case of fading channels is also found as an infinite
series, which is given by [18]
fσ2v(x) =
1
pix
∞∑
k=1
(−1)k+1Γ (α+2k
α
)
sin
(
2kpi
α
)
k!
piλIΓ (α−2α )E
{
|hij|
4
α
}
P
2
α
I
x
2
α
k . (29)
We note that E
{
|hij|
4
α
}
in (29) is related to the distribution of fading channel. In the case of
Rayleigh fading, we have E
{
|hij|
4
α
}
= Γ
(
α+2
α
)
, and
fσ2v(x) =
1
pix
∞∑
k=1
(−1)k+1Γ (α+2k
α
)
sin
(
2kpi
α
)
k!
2pi2λI csc (2piα )P 2αI
αx
2
α
k . (30)
The average covert probability for the case of fading channels is given by
ξ¯ =
∫ ∞
0
min
γ>0
∫ ∞
0
ξ
(
γ, σ2vw , Pw
)
fσ2v
(
σ2vw
)
dσ2vwfPw (Pw) dPw
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1− max
γ>Pw
∫ γ
γ−Pw
fσ2v
(
σ2vw
)
dσ2vw
)
fPw (Pw) dPw. (31)
Substituting (28) and (29) into (31), we further derive the average covert probability for the case
of fading channels as
ξ¯ =
∫ ∞
0
dαaw
Pa
fh
(
dαawPw
Pa
)
1− 1
pi
max
γ>Pw
∞∑
k=1
(−1)k+1Γ(2k
α
)
sin
(
2kpi
α
)(
piλIΓ
(
α−2
α
)
E
{
|hij|
4
α
}
P
2
α
I
)k
k!
(
1
(γ−Pw)
2k
α
− 1
γ
2k
α
)dPw.
(32)
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Based on (16) and (29), the connection outage probability for the case of fading channels is
given by
pcnout =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
Pb(2R−1)−1
fσ2v
(
σ2vb
)
dσ2vbfPb (Pb) dPb,
=
∫ ∞
0
dαab
Pa
fh
(
dαabPb
Pa
)
1
pi
∞∑
k=1
(−1)k+1Γ (2k
α
)
sin
(
2kpi
α
)
k!
piλIΓ (α−2α )E
{
|hij|
4
α
}
P
2
α
I(
Pb (2R − 1)−1
) 2
α
kdPb.
(33)
The basic method to obtain the covert throughput η for the case of fading channels is the same
as the non-fading channels. We first solve for Pa to ξ¯(Pa) =  to find the maximum allowable
transmit power at Alice subject to the constraint on the covertness, denoted by P ∗a . With the
derived P ∗a , we then solve for R to p
cn
out(Pa) = δ with Pa = P
∗
a to obtain η. Since neither the
solution of Pa to ξ¯(Pa) =  nor the solution of R to pcnout(Pa, R) = δ is analytically tractable, the
derivation of the covert throughput for the case of fading channels is analytically intractable.
Similar to the analysis in Section III, although (32) and (33) may be complicated to calculate,
nevertheless they are crucial in analyzing the impacts of the density and the transmit power of
the concurrent interferers on the covert throughput in the interference-limited network with a
Poisson field of interferers over fading channels, as will be shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: In the interference-limited network with a Poisson field of interferers over fading
channels, the covert throughput, η, is not affected by the density of concurrent interferers, λI ,
or the transmit power at the interferers, PI .
Proof: See Appendix C.
Again, we highlight the importance of the finding in Theorem 2. Different from the conven-
tional impression that the density and the transmit power are main factors affecting the overall
throughput performance in wireless networks [2, 13, 34], our analysis finds that the throughput
for covert communication in the interference-limited network over fading channels is affected
by neither the density nor the transmit power of the concurrent interferers in the network.
A. Rayleigh Fading with α = 4
We now consider the case of Rayleigh fading, such that hij ∼ CN (0, 1), where j = b or w
and i ∈ Φ. Again, we consider the special case of α = 4, since the closed-form expression for
the distribution of the aggregate interference power exists for α = 4 only [34].
15
The distributions of Pb and Pw for the case of Rayleigh fading channels with α = 4 are,
respectively, given by
fPb(x) =
d4ab
Pa
exp
(
−d
4
abx
Pa
)
, x > 0 (34)
and
fPw(x) =
d4aw
Pa
exp
(
−d
4
awx
Pa
)
, x > 0. (35)
When α = 4 and hij ∼ CN (0, 1), σ2vj follows the Le´vy distribution with the scalar parameter
ζ = pi4λ2IPI/8 [34], and we have
fσ2v(x) =
pi
3
2λI
√
PI
4x
3
2
exp
(
−pi
4λ2IPI
16x
)
, x > 0. (36)
The average covert probability for the case of Rayleigh fading channels with α = 4 is given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The average covert probability for the system over Rayleigh fading channels
with α = 4 is given by
ξ¯ = 1− d
4
aw
Pa
∫ ∞
0
(
erf
(
pi2λI
√
PI
4
√
xo − Pw
)
− erf
(
pi2λI
√
PI
4
√
xo
))
exp
(
−Pwd
4
aw
Pa
)
dPw, (37)
where xo is the solution of x ≥ Pw to
(x− Pw)
3
2 exp
(
−pi
4λ2IPI
16x
)
− x 32 exp
(
− pi
4λ2IPI
16 (x− Pw)
)
= 0. (38)
Proof: See Appendix D.
The connection outage probability for the case of Rayleigh fading channels with α = 4 is
given by
pcnout =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
Pb(2R−1)−1
fσ2v
(
σ2vb
)
dσ2vbfPb (Pb) dPb
= 1− exp
(
−pi
2λId
2
ab
√
PI (2R − 1)
2
√
Pa
)
. (39)
Similar to the case of non-fading channels with α = 4, the solution of Pa to ξ¯(Pa) =  can be
numerically obtained and the solution of R to pcnout(Pa, R) = δ is analytically tractable, which is
given by
R = log2
(
1 +
4Pa (ln(1− δ))2
PIpi4λ2Id
4
ab
)
. (40)
The covert throughput of the considered system over Rayleigh fading channels with α = 4
can be obtained from an algorithm similar to the algorithm discussed in Section III-A, and the
detailed algorithm is omitted here to avoid repetition.
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V. COVERT COMMUNICATION IN INTERFERENCE NETWORK WITH AWGN
In the previous sections, we focus on the scenario of interference-limited network, such that the
AWGN at the receivers are negligible, i.e., σ2zb = σ
2
zw = 0. In this section, we take the non-zero
AWGN into account. We assume that σ2zb and σ
2
zw are known at Bob and Willie, respectively.
A. Impact of AWGN on System Performance
Subject to the AWGN, Willie attempts to determine whether Alice is transmitting or not by
distinguishing the following two hypotheses now:
H0 : yw[n] = vw[n] + zw[n], (41a)
H1 : yw[n] =
√
Pa
dαai
haix[n] + vw[n] + zw[n]. (41b)
Based on the received vector yw = [yw[1], · · · , yw[n]], Willie makes a binary decision on
whether the received signal is the interference plus the noise or the signal from Alice plus
the interference and the noise. With the radiometer as the detector, the test statistic is T (yw) =
(1/N)
∑N
n=1 |yw[n]|2. The false alarm probability and the misdetection probability for a given
threshold γ are now, respectively, given by
PFA =
Γ
(
N, Nγ
σ2vw+σ
2
zw
)
Γ(N)
(42)
and
PMD = 1−
Γ
(
N, Nγ
Pw+σ2vw+σ
2
zw
)
Γ(N)
. (43)
As N →∞, the performance of Willie’s hypothesis test is given by
ξ
(
σ2vw , γ, Pw, σ
2
zw
)
=
 0 , if σ2vw + σ2zw ≤ γ ≤ Pw + σ2vw + σ2zw1 , otherwise, (44)
and the average covert probability is given by
ξ¯(Pa, σ
2
zw) =
∫ ∞
0
min
γ>0
∫ ∞
0
ξ
(
γ, σ2vw , Pw, σ
2
zw
)
fσ2v
(
σ2vw
)
dσ2vwfPw (Pw) dPw. (45)
From (44) and (45), we have the following proposition on the impact of AWGN on the average
covert probability of the considered system.
Proposition 3: Having the non-zero AWGN at Willie does not affect the average covert
probability, i.e., ξ¯(Pa, σ2zw = a) = ξ¯(Pa, σ
2
zw = 0) for any a > 0.
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Proof: Note that Willie knows the noise variance, σ2zw . Thus, for any given σ
2
zw , Willie can
set his optimal power detection threshold as the optimal threshold for the case of no AWGN plus
the noise variance σ2zw . Then, the resulted average covert probability for the case of non-zero
AWGN remains the same as that for the case of no AWGN.
Based on Proposition 3, we note that the expressions for the average covert probabilities are
not affected by the non-zero AWGN. Hence, the average covert probabilities for the case of
AWGN channels and the case of fading channels with AWGN are still given by (20) and (32),
respectively.
With the non-zero AWGN at Bob, the connection outage probability is given by
pcnout(Pa, R, σ
2
zb
) = P
(
log2
(
1 +
Pb
σ2vb + σ
2
zb
)
< R
)
(a)
= P
(
σ2vb >
[
Pb
(
2R − 1)−1 − σ2zb]+)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
[Pb(2R−1)−1−σ2zb ]
+
fσ2v
(
σ2vb
)
dσ2vbfPb (Pb) dPb, (46)
where (a) is due to the fact that σ2vb is nonnegative. From (46), we find that having non-zero
AWGN at Bob increases the connection outage probability, since pcnout(Pa, R, σ
2
zb
) increases as σ2zb
increases. Following the similar analysis given in Sections III and IV, we obtain the connection
outage probabilities for the case of AWGN channels and the case of fading channels with AWGN,
respectively, as
pcnout =
1
pi
∞∑
k=1
Γ
(
2k
α
)
k!
 piλIΓ (α−2α )P 2αI([
Pad
−α
ab (2
R − 1)−1 − σ2zb
]+) 2α

k
sin
(
kpi
(
α− 2
α
))
(47)
and
pcnout =
∫ ∞
0
dαab
Pa
fh
(
dαabPb
Pa
)
1
pi
∞∑
k=1
(−1)k+1Γ (2k
α
)
sin
(
2kpi
α
)
k!
piλIΓ
(
α−2
α
)
E
{
|hij|
4
α
}
P
2
α
I([
Pb (2R − 1)−1 − σ2zb
]+) 2α

k
dPb.
(48)
Recall that the covert throughput is given by
η = max R, s.t. ξ¯(Pa) ≥ 1−  and pcnout(Pa, R, σ2zb) ≤ δ. (49)
Based on the analysis above, we note that having the non-zero AWGN does not affect the
covertness constraint ξ¯(Pa) ≥ 1− , while we have to decrease the transmission rate R to satisfy
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the reliability constraint pcnout(Pa, R, σ
2
zb
) ≤ δ as the non-zero AWGN is taken into consideration.
Thus, having the non-zero AWGN decreases the achievable covert throughput compared with
the interference-limited network.
B. Impact of Network Parameters with AWGN Consideration
In Sections III and IV, we have obtained the important findings on the impact of network
parameters on the covert throughput in the interference-limited networks in Theorems 1 and 2.
Based on Theorems 1 and 2 and the analysis in Section V-A, we have the following corollaries
regarding the impact of network parameters on the covert throughput in the wireless network
with the consideration of AWGN.
Corollary 1: In the network with a Poisson field of interferers over AWGN channels, the
covert throughput, η, increases as the density of concurrent interferers, λI , or the transmit power
at interferers, PI , increases.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Corollary 2: In the network with a Poisson field of interferers over fading channels with the
AWGN, the covert throughput, η, increases as the density of concurrent interferers, λI , or the
transmit power at interferers, PI , increases.
Proof: The proof of Corollary 2 is similar to that of Corollary 1, i.e., Appendix E. The
details are omitted here for brevity.
We highlight that important insights can be drawn from the results in Corollaries 1 and 2 and
Theorems 1 and 2 together. That is, while increasing the interference helps to improve covert
throughput for the system with AWGN, such a benefit is diminishing as the interference increases
and the system becomes interference-limited.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results. Unless otherwise stated, we set the transmit
power at interferers as PI = 20 dBm, the density of concurrent interferers as λI = 10−3, the
distance between Alice and Bob as dab = 2, the distance between Alice and Warden as daw = 5,
the covertness requirement as  = 0.1, the reliability requirement as δ = 0.1, the path loss
exponent as α = 4, and the power of AWGN as σ2zb = σ
2
zw = σ
2
z = −50 dBm. The results
without and with fading are both shown. For the result with fading, we consider the Rayleigh
fading.
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Fig. 2: Without fading: average covert probability versus density of concurrent interferers.
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Fig. 3: With fading: average covert probability versus density of concurrent interferers.
We first demonstrate the average covert probability, ξ¯, for networks with different densities of
concurrent interferers, λI , and different transmit powers at interferers, PI . Figures 2 and 3 plot
ξ¯ versus λI with different values of PI for the case without fading and the case with fading,
respectively. The transmit power at Alice is set as Pa = 0 dBm. As shown in both figures, ξ¯
increases until it approaches 1, as λI or PI increases, which indicates that the average covert
probability improves as the interference grows. In addition, we intuitively know that the reliability
performance worsens for larger interference. Mathematically, the connection outage probability,
pcnout, increases as λI or PI increases. Thus, the increase of interference has a positive effect on
the average covert probability and a negative effect on the reliability performance, and it is not
20
easy to determine from intuitions the impacts of λI and PI on the overall rate performance of
the system, i.e, the covert throughput, η.
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Fig. 4: Covert throughput versus density of concurrent interferers.
We now show the impact of the density of concurrent interferers, λI , on the covert throughput,
η. Figure 4 plots η versus λI for cases with and without the fading. As depicted in the figure,
when λ is relatively small, η increases as λI increases. That observation is consistent with the
findings in Corollaries 1 and 2. That is, with the consideration AWGN, the covert throughput
increases as the density of concurrent interferers increases. We also note from the figure that,
when λ becomes relatively large, η remains (almost) constant as λI further increases. That
observation is consistent with the findings in Theorems 1 and 2. As the density of concurrent
interferers becomes relatively large, the network becomes interference-limited, and the covert
throughput is not affected by the density of concurrent interferers in the interference-limited
network.
We then present the impact of the transmit power at interferers, PI , on the covert throughput,
η. Figure 5 plots η versus PI for cases with and without the fading. Similar to the observations in
Figure 4, we note that η increases as λI increases, when PI is relatively small. When PI becomes
relatively large, η remains (almost) constant as PI further increases. Those observations are also
consistent with the findings in Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2.
We further illustrate the covert throughput, η, subject to different levels of covertness require-
ment, , where the covertness constraint is ξ¯ ≥ 1 − . Figure 6 plots η versus  for cases with
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Fig. 5: Covert throughput versus transmit power at interferers.
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Fig. 6: Covert throughput versus covertness requirement.
and without the fading. As the figure shows, η increases as  increases, which indicates that a
larger covert throughput can be achieved as the requirement on covertness becomes looser.
Finally, we show the effect of having AWGN at the receivers on the covert throughput. Figure 7
plots the covert throughput, η, versus the power of AWGN, σ2z . We note from the figure that
η remains (almost) constant as σ2z increases, when σ
2
z is relatively small. This is because the
network is interference-limited when σ2z is small, and the small increase of σ
2
z has little impact
on the system in the interference-limited network. We further note that η decreases as σ2z further
increases, which is consistent with the analysis given in Section V-A.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have studied the covert communication in wireless networks with a Poisson
field of interferers. We have analyzed the average covert probability, the connection outage
probability, and the covert throughput of the system for the non-fading and the fading cases.
Although the expressions for the average covert probability and the connection outage probability
with general values of the path loss exponent may be complicated to calculate due to the
stochastic geometry, nevertheless they are crucial in analyzing the impacts of the density and
the transmit power of the concurrent interferers on the covert throughput. In particular, we have
analytically found that the covert throughput is affected by neither the density nor the transmit
power of the concurrent interferers in interference-limited networks for both cases of non-fading
and fading channels. We have further derived the simplified expressions for the average covert
probability and the connection outage probability by considering α = 4 for both cases. Moreover,
we have found that, when the AWGN is not negligible, the covert throughput increases as the
density or the transmit power of the concurrent interferers increases.
While this paper has focused on the scenario where the covertness constraint is imposed on
a single link, a natural extension is to investigate the scenario where the covertness constraint
is imposed on all communication links in the wireless network.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first show the proof that η is not affected by λI . With ξ¯ = 1−  and pcnout = δ, the covert
throughput is given as the solution of R to
δ =
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
(
λI
(P ∗a )
2
αd−2ab (2R − 1)−
2
α
)k
, (50)
where
f1(k) =
Γ
(
2k
α
) (
piΓ
(
α−2
α
)
P
2
α
I
)k
k!pi
sin
(
kpi
(
α− 2
α
))
, (51)
P ∗a is the solution of Pa to
 = max
γ>Pad
−α
aw
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
( λI
(γ − Pad−αaw )
2
α
)k
−
(
λI
(γ)
2
α
)k . (52)
We use P ∗a1 and η1 to represent the solution of Pa to (52) with λI = λI1 > 0 and the covert
throughput for λI = λI1 > 0, i.e., the solution of R to (50) with λI = λI1 > 0 and P ∗a = P
∗
a1,
respectively. For any real positive value u, we then have
 = max
γ>P ∗a1d
−α
aw
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
( λI1
(γ − P ∗a1d−αaw )
2
α
)k
−
(
λI1
γ
2
α
)k
= max
γ>P ∗a1d
−α
aw
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)

 uλI1(
u
α
2 γ − uα2 P ∗a1d−αaw
) 2
α
k −
 uλI1(
u
α
2 γ
) 2
α
k

(a)
= max
γ>u
α
2 P ∗a1d
−α
aw
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)

 uλI1(
γ − uα2 P ∗a1d−αaw
) 2
α
k − (uλI1
γ
2
α
)k , (53)
and
δ =
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
(
λI1
(P ∗a1)
2
αd−2ab (2η1 − 1)−
2
α
)k
=
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
 uλI1(
u
α
2 P ∗a1
) 2
α d−2ab (2η1 − 1)−
2
α
k , (54)
where (a) in (53) is derived by interchanging u
α
2 γ to γ.
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Now, define λI2 = uλI1. We use P ∗a2 and η2 to represent the solution of Pa to (52) with
λI = λI2 and the covert throughput for λI = λI2, i.e., the solution of R to (50) with λI = λI2
and P ∗a = P
∗
a2, respectively. We then have
 = max
γ>P ∗a2d
−α
aw
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
( λI2
(γ − P ∗a2d−αaw )
2
α
)k
−
(
λI2
γ
2
α
)k
= max
γ>P ∗a2d
−α
aw
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
( uλI1
(γ − P ∗a2d−αaw )
2
α
)k
−
(
uλI1
γ
2
α
)k . (55)
Comparing (53) and (55), we note that P ∗a2 = u
α
2 P ∗a1. With P
∗
a2 = u
α
2 P ∗a1, we further have
δ =
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
(
λI2
(P ∗a2)
2
αd−2ab (2η2 − 1)−
2
α
)k
=
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
 uλI1(
u
α
2 P ∗a1
) 2
α d−2ab (2η2 − 1)−
2
α
k , (56)
Comparing (54) and (56), we note that η2 = η1. Thus, the system with λI = λI1 and the system
with λI = λI2 = uλI1 have the same covert throughput. In other words, the covert throughput,
η, remains the same for systems with different values of λI . The proof that η is not affected
by PI can be shown with the similar method as given above, and hence is omitted here. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Substituting into (22) into (19), we have
ξ¯ = 1− max
γ>Pw
∫ γ
γ−Pw
piλ
√
PI
2(σ2vw)
3
2
exp
(
−pi
3λ2PI
4σ2vw
)
dσ2vw . (57)
To derive the average covert probability, we first need to determine the optimal threshold of
Willie’s detector, which is given by
γo = arg max
γ>Pw
T1(γ), (58)
where T1(γ) =
∫ γ
γ−Pw
piλ
√
Pi
2(σ2vw )
3
2
exp
(
−pi3λ2PI
4σ2vw
)
dσ2vw = erf
(
λI
√
pi3PI
2
√
γ−Pw
)
− erf
(
λI
√
pi3Pi
2
√
γ
)
. The
average covert probability can be then rewrite as
ξ¯ = 1− T1(γo). (59)
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Taking the first derivative of T (γ) with respect to γ, we have
T ′1(γ) =
√
B1√
pi
(
exp(−B1
γ
)
γ
3
2
− exp(−
B1
γ−Pw )
(γ − Pw)
3
2
)
, (60)
where B1 = pi3λ2Pi/4. We note from (60) that limγ→Pw T ′1(γ) > 0, limγ→∞ T
′
1(γ) < 0 and
T ′1(γ) is a continuous function for γ ≥ Pw. Thus, there is at least one solution of γ to the
equation T ′1(γ) = 0 for γ ≥ Pw. We further note that there would be a single solution of γ ≥ Pw
to T ′1(γ) = 0, which would also be γ
o, if T1(γ) is a (strictly) quasiconcave function of γ for
γ ≥ Pw. Thus, in what follows, we prove that T1(γ) is a quasiconcave function of γ for γ ≥ Pw.
We prove the quasiconcavity of T1(γ) by the (converse) second-order condition for quasicon-
cavity. That is, if a function satisfies the condition: at any point with zero slope, the second
derivative is non-positive, then the function is quasiconcave.
Taking the second derivative of T1(γ) with respect to γ, we have
T ′′1 (γ) =
√
B1√
pi
(
B1 exp(−B1γ )
γ
7
2
− 3 exp(−
B1
γ
)
2γ
5
2
− B1 exp(−
B1
γ−Pw )
(γ − Pw)
7
2
+
3 exp(− B1
γ−Pw )
2 (γ − Pw)
5
2
)
. (61)
When T ′1(γ) = 0, solving for B1 to T
′
1 = 0, we have
B1 =
3γ (γ − Pw)
2Pw
ln
(
γ
γ − Pw
)
. (62)
Substituting (62) into (60), we find
sgn (T ′′1 (γ)) = sgn
(
3Pw − 3 (2γ − Pw) ln
(
γ
γ − Pw
))
. (63)
With the inequality on logarithm log(x) ≥ 1− 1/x, we have
3Pw − 3 (2γ − Pw) ln
(
γ
γ − Pw
)
≤ 3Pw (Pw − γ)
γ
. (64)
Thus, when T ′1(γ) = 0, we note that T
′′
1 (γ) < 0 for γ > Pw, which proves that T1(γ) is a
(strictly) quasiconcave function for γ > Pw. We hence obtain γo as the solution of γ > Pw to
T ′1(γ) = 0, i.e., the solution of x > Pw to (24). Finally, substituting γ
o into (59) obtains the
average covert probability in (23). This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 given in Appendix A, we here first show the proof that η
is not affected by λI , and the proof that η is not affected by PI can be easily shown with the
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similar method. We can rewrite the average covert probability in (31) and the connection outage
probability in (33) as
ξ¯ =
∫ ∞
0
fh(x)− max
γ>Pad
−α
aw x
∞∑
k=1
f2(k, x)
( λI
(γ − Pad−αawx)
2
α
)k
−
(
λI
(γ)
2
α
)k dx (65)
and
pcnout =
∫ ∞
0
∞∑
k=1
f2(k, x)
(
λI
P
2
α
a x
2
αd−2ab (2R − 1)−
2
α
)k
dx, (66)
respectively, where
f2(k, x) =
(−1)k+1Γ (2k
α
)
sin
(
2kpi
α
) (
piΓ
(
α−2
α
)
E
{
|hij|
4
α
}
P
2
α
I
)k
fh (x)
k!pi
. (67)
Following the similar steps given in Appendix A, we can prove that the systems with λI = λI1
and λI = uλI1 have the same covert throughput for any u > 0. This completes the proof of
Theorem 2.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Substituting (35) and (36) into (19), we have
ξ¯ =
∫ ∞
0
(
1− max
γ>Pw
∫ γ
γ−Pw
pi
3
2λI
√
PI
4x
3
2
exp
(
−pi
4λ2IPI
16x
))
dαaw
Pa
exp
(
−d
α
awPw
Pa
)
dPw. (68)
To derive the average covert probability, we need to determine the optimal threshold of Willie’s
detector for a given Pw, which is given by
γo = arg max
γ>Pw
T2(γ), (69)
where T2(γ) =
∫ γ
γ−Pw
pi
3
2 λI
√
PI
4x
3
2
exp
(
−pi4λ2IPI
16x
)
= erf
(
pi2λI
√
PI
4
√
γ−Pw
)
− erf
(
pi2λI
√
PI
4
√
γ
)
. The average
covert probability can be then rewritten as
ξ¯ = 1− T2(γo). (70)
Taking the first derivative of T2(γ) with respect to γ, we have
T ′2(γ) =
√
B2√
pi
(
exp(−B2
γ
)
γ
3
2
− exp(−
B2
γ−Pw )
(γ − Pw)
3
2
)
, (71)
where B2 = pi4λ2PI/16. We note that (71) is similar to (60) in Appendix B. Following the
similar steps given Appendix D, we can prove that T ′′2 (γ) < 0 when T
′
2(γ) = 0 for γ > Pw.
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Hence, T2(γ) is a (strictly) quasiconcave function for γ > Pw, and γo is the solution of γ > Pw
to T ′2(γ) = 0. Finally, substituting γ
o into (70) obtain the average covert probability in (37). This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
In the following, we present the proof that η increases as λI increases. The proof that η
increases as PI increases can be shown with the similar method, and hence, is omitted here for
brevity.
With the equations of ξ¯ = 1−  and pcnout = δ, η is given as the solution of R to
δ =
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
 λI([
P ∗a d
−α
ab (2
R − 1)−1 − σ2zb
]+) 2α

k
, (72)
where f1(k) =
Γ( 2kα )
(
piΓ(α−2α )P
2
α
I
)k
k!pi
sin
(
kpi
(
α−2
α
))
and P ∗a is the solution of Pa to
 = max
γ>Pad
−α
aw
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
( λI
(γ − Pad−αaw )
2
α
)k
−
(
λI
(γ)
2
α
)k . (73)
Note that the expression for the optimal Pa, i.e., P ∗a , is the same as that for the case of no
AWGN, i.e., the solution of Pa to (52), since ξ¯ is not related to the non-zero AWGN.
Denote the optimal Pa when λI = λI1 > 0 by P ∗a1. Denote the covert throughput when
λI = λI1 > 0 by η1. We have
δ =
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
 λI1([
P ∗a1d
−α
ab (2
η1 − 1)−1 − σ2zb
]+) 2α

k
. (74)
For any u > 0, denote the optimal Pa when λI = λI2 = uλI1 > 0 by P ∗a2. Denote the covert
throughput when λI = λI2 by η2. From the analysis on the case of no AWGN, we know that
P ∗a2 = u
α
2 P ∗a1. We then have
δ =
∞∑
k=1
f1(k)
 λI1([
γ∗1d
−α
ab (2
η2 − 1)−1 − u−α2 σ2zb
]+) 2α

k
. (75)
Since α ≥ 2, we have u−α2 < 1 when u > 1. Hence, comparing (74) and (75), we have η2 > η1
when m > 1. In addition, we have λI2 = uλI1 > λI1 when u > 1. Therefore, η2 > η1 when
λI2 > λI1. This completes the proof.
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